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Abstract
We developed a new-Keynesian DSGE model with heterogeneous agents and an ac-
tive interbank market, characterized by an endogenous default probability. Banks are
heterogeneous in the sense that they face, each period, different liquidity shocks and may
or not be constrained in the total amount of credit that they can extend to the private
sector. Banks can invest in loans to firms, risk less assets or lend one another. The key
feature of the analysis is that the probability of default of banks evolves endogenously
and is explicitly taken into account by other banks in their investment decisions. In each
period, only a fraction, or even none, of banks’ surplus funds is invested on loans to
other financial institutions. If the probability of default is high enough, they shift their
portfolio choices to risk-less assets and the interbank market freezes. This affects the
total supply of credit to firms and, through it, the total level of investments, output and
employment.
The model is than estimated using the Bayes technique and several test are carried
on to verify the robustness of the estimation. Our findings show that indeed the default
probability plays a crucial role in the decision of banks directly affects the economy; in
addition we show how the stability of the financial market affects the the real economy and
is connected with real and financial variables. In times of financial turmoil, banks reduce
their exposure towards other financial institution, reducing the total supply of loans to
the private sector and worsening the crisis. In this context, standard inflation targeting,
that seems adequate as a response to standard shocks, is not sufficient to counterbalance
negative shocks and may even have a negative effect on the economy, leaving room for
unconventional tools. In addition, following real shocks, we have identified an additional
channel of transmission of monetary policy, through the resiliance of banks.
1 Introduction
The last financial crisis has shown how even financial markets are far from the “perfect
competition” paradigm and how they are influenced by friction just as any other type
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of market. Economic theory was, in some case, unable to predict the real extent of the
crisis and, at the beginning, to formulate effective policy measures to offset its effect on
the real economy (Bernanke [2013], Guillen [2011], Thornton [2012]).
In the aftermath of the crisis the key questions were to understand why some of
the policy measures carried out by policy makers were so ineffective (Claessens et al.
[2010]) and which tools were more unadeguate to the complex economic scenario we
were facing1.
In this context, one of the key issue to analyze is the relationship between financial
markets and the real economy, trying to understand, from a macroeconomic point of
view, which is the role played by the probability of default and by financial frictions.
In the past, this topic was more popular in the literature on developing economies, for
example in Ordonez [2009], but now we know how it is important also for advanced
economies after the contagion and spillover effects that took place on financial markets.
During the crisis the interbank market froze up, leading to an increasing pressure
over institutions already in distress and a reduction of the credit to the real economy.
What was surprising at that time was the velocity with which the crisis spreaded and
its strength, considering its relatively modest nature at the origin2. Suddenly, financial
intermediaries stopped to lend money each other, tightening the liquidity constraint
that each of them was facing and reducing even more the credit supplied to firms3. It
is clear that an important role was played by the increased default probability4 and by
the reduction of trust between financial agents.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between riskiness and port-
folio choices of banks. In order to do so the economy is modeled with an active banking
sector populated by heterogeneous5 banks that can allocate their funds between: i) di-
rect lending to firms, ii) interbank lendings to other financial institutions, iii) risk-free
assets.
This stylized balance sheet presents the basic problem of allocation of resources for
a banker. Interbank lendings provide higher returns than risk-free assets, but may not
be rapid. When bankers choose how to allocate excess resources, they try to balance
1See Friedman [2012], Krugman [2012], Stiglitz [2010], Turner [2012].
2See Delli Gatti [2012], Guillen [2011], Allen et al. [2010].
3On this topic, can be seen Brunnermeier [2009] and Gorton [2009].
4See De Socio [2011].
5Heterogeneity in macro models has been shown to play a very important role in understanding
business cycle facts. In particular, results that are valid in the “representative agents” paradigm may
not be robust to the diversification of economic actors. On this topic it is possible to see Branch and
Evans [2005], Delli Gatti and Longaretti [2006], Hommes [2006], de Grave et al. [2010] and Motta and
Tirelli [2010].
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these two aspects and, as we will discuss in later parts of this work, when a crisis hit
the system they shift their portfolio choice to risk-free assets. Doing so, the final credit
to the economy is reduced and the crisis worsened; in addition banks already in distress
are more financially constrained and are forced to refuse to finance valuable projects,
reducing profits and dealing the strengthening of their net worth.
This behavior of the model resembles what happened in the economy between 2007
and 2010. The contribution of the paper is to investigate the reasons for this behaviors of
bankers. Bankers optimize considering the probability of default of their counterpart.
In particular, ceteris paribus, they know that each additional unit of credit granted
will make their debtor more leveredged and, therefore, more exposed to the risk of
default. So, when the expected returns (defined as the gross rate weighted for the
default probability) of interbank lendings equal the risk-less rate, bankers choose to not
issue additional units of credits to other banks.
In this model, in addition, it is shown how there are also reasons exogenous from
the debtor-creditor relation that influence the leverage of banks. As pointed out before,
when the leverage increases, ceteris paribus, interbank credit decreases and less loans
are issued to firms. An addition contribution of this paper is to investigate this second
channel of crunch in the interbank market and the relation between real and financial
shocks and default probability on the interbank markets.
The role of the default probability was analyzed in the past years by several empirical
works6, but has received moderate attention in theoretical researches.
On this topic, the larger part of the studies come from the microeconomics of finance
literature7, although in the recent years there have been some attempts to incorporate
it into macroeconomic models8. Beside those attempts, however, I think that there is
still the necessity to develop a more comprehensive and complete framework that could
allow us to define the default probability as an endogenous variable. This is what I will
try to do in the following pages.
On top of the complex interbank market, we propose, a second source of friction
between banks. Basically, banks’ credit relations are affected by moral hazard9 given the
inability of creditors to control the action of the bank’s manager. This second channel
affects the total supply of credit and inserts additional frictions in the model. To model
6For example by Hong et al. [2009], Heider et al. [2009] or Bracke [2010].
7For example Leland and Toft [1996] or Diamond and Rajan [2001].
8For example in Stiglitz and Greenwald [2003], Angeloni and Faia [2009] or Dib [2010].
9Game theory, in particular agency and moral hazard problems applied to macroeconomics are an
increasingly significant field of research. On this topic, in particular, it is possible to see the already
cited Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010], Phelan and Townsend [1991], Dib [2010] and Meeks et al. [2013].
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this behavior of bankers we propose a set up similar to that of Gertler and Kiyotaki
[2010] and more recently in Gertler and Kiyotaki [2015]. Despite the abbundancy of
the literature, that bloomed after the crisis10, we believe that this approach combines
flexibility with consistent and meaningful results.
In this paper we will incorporate the complex interbank market described before
into a new-keynesian DSGE model; this is something new to the literature given the
endogeneity of the default probability in the model. Previous attempts, such as Dib
[2010], proposed alternative approaches, for example defining the default probability as
a choice variable for bankers. Our choice, however, is preferable given the explicit rela-
tion between the default probability and the balance sheet of banks and the possibility
to track its movements along the business cycle.
In addition to the original configuration of the interbank market, we have incorpo-
rated classic market friction in the model. As has been pointed out in the literature,
starting from the pioneering work of Bernanke et al. [1999], financial accelerator plays
an important role in the economy 11 with the more complex lender-borrower dynamic
and overcoming the assumption of the validity of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem12. Ad-
ditionally we have inserted standard market frictions in the goods market, trough the
Calvo formalism13 and monopolistic competition following Dixit and Stiglitz [1977].
Our contribution, at last, differs from the network literature on financial markets
such as Allena and Gale [2000], Delli Gatti et al. [2006] and Battiston et al. [2012]14
for several reasons. While in that field researchers try to exploits the proprieties of
networks to understand the connection between economic agents and, in particular,
the mechanisms behind the transmission of shocks and the effects of monetary policies
we have constructed an environment of heterogeneous agents in which banks are linked
together by borrowing relationships that evolves and changes trough time15. In contrast
to the network literature the dynamics do not arise as property of the underline network
but as behaviors and strategical choices of the agents.
10For example, it is possible we can remember Bernanke and Gertler [1989], Krishnamurthy [2003],
Angeloni and Faia [2009], Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010], Brunnermeier et al. [2012], Brunnermeier and
Sunnikov [2014].
11Just to make a couple of example, it is possible to see Gilchrist and Zakrajsek [2012] and Ham-
mersland and Trae [2012].
12Modigliani and Miller [1958] and Modigliani and Miller [1963].
13Calvo [1983]
14Additional references may be given by Beltratti et al. [1996], Gale and Kariv [2007] and Elliott
et al. [2014].
15In particular, we allow for banks to become lenders or borrowers on the interbank market condi-
tioned on the realization of an exogenous shock.
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The model will be finally estimated with the Bayes rule in order to obtain impulse
response functions augmented with confidence intervals. We will present the policy
implication of their analysis in the relative section.
The paper will be developed as follows: section 2 presents the model, section 3 the
data, section 4 the Bayesian estimation of the model with robustness checks, section 5
the Bayesian impulse response functions and section 6 the final conclusions.
2 The Model
The economy of the model is populated by households, firms, banks, a government and
a Central Bank.
Households owns firms, consume differentiated goods and save trough deposits.
Within each household, a fraction of its member is composed by workers and another
by bakers, with the fraction of bankers and workers constant trough time. Workers
supply labor to firms and earns wages; bankers run banks and return their profits16 to
households as dividends that are paid only when a bank ends its activity. To avoid that
banks accumulate enough capital to overcome any kind of financial constraint, I assume
that in each period there is a probability that a bank ends its activity. In that case,
the banker transfer all his remaining assets to households and becomes a worker while
households provide to new bankers an initial endowment of capital. In each household
there is perfect consumption insurance, therefore the returns on banking activity and
the wages earned are pulled together to finance the household’s expenses. Households
use their incomes to finance consumption, to pay taxes and to save, in the form of the
purchase of risk-less deposits.
The real sector of the economy is composed by goods producers, retailers and capital
producers.
Good producers combine capital and labor to produce, in perfect competition, an
undifferentiated good that is sold to retailers. They do not accumulate capital, so in
each period, they need to finance the already installed capital and investments borrow-
ing funds from the financial system. In addition, each firm is located on a different
area and can borrow money only from banks located in the same area. In each period,
finally, there is an exogenous probability that in each area emerge new investments
opportunities. I am following here what proposed by Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010], and
I will call this probability pii and the opposite probability pin = 1− pii.
16As we are in perfect competition, profits are defined as the returns on the invested capital.
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Retailers acquire the output of good producers, differentiate it with negligible costs
and sell it on a national market to households. Because they sell a differentiated good
they enjoy some degree of market power and, therefore, can charge a price higher than
the marginal cost. In addition, following the standard idea of Calvo prices17, they are
not able to update the price they charge in each period.
Finally, capital producers combine undepreciated capital and a fraction of final
goods to produce new capital.
The financial sector is composed by banks that are finitely lived and raise liquidity
from deposits and a national interbank market. Each bank may use its funds to finance
interbank loans, loans to firms or to acquire risk-less assets. In each period there is a
probability that a bank ends its activity; in that case the entire value of the equity is
transferred to households. Banks are run by bankers, who optimize the capital structure
in order to maximize the value of the bank’s capital at the end of the period and, in
that way, maximize the transfer that is made to households in case the bank closes.
Because they run the bank, they can also divert a fraction of the total volume of funds
intermediated and transfer it to households. If in a given period the value of the bank
is lower than the value of divertible assets, the banker will divert funds from the bank
and transfer them to the households. In that case, the bank defaults18. Each bank,
at last, is located on a specific area and while it can borrow on national markets, it
can lend money only to firms located in its same area. Bankers know if in their area
there are new investment possibilities only after that the period is already started, but
they have to decide the level of deposit at the beginning of each period, before that
the shock is revealed. For this reason, some banks will have excess funds while others
will have a deficit of liquidity. Following Stiglitz and Greenwald [2003] I assume that
only banks on areas without new investments acquire risk-less assets, this assumption
will be proved endogenously later on. What is crucial for the development of the model
is the way in which the credit cycle works: bankers choose the level of deposits before
the beginning of the period; then they know if there are new investment possibility on
their area and, then, they make their investment choices. I assume also that there is
some degree of uncertainty on the outcome of new investments projects, for the reason
that they are new and more risky.
For what concerns the last two agents of the model, the Central Bank and the
17See Calvo [1983].
18This dynamic leads to the definition of an agency problem between lenders and borrowers, follow-
ing, between the others, Kiyotaki and Moore [1997], Krishnamurthy [2003] and Fostel and Geanakoplos
[2009].
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Government, I assume that the Central Bank sets the risk-less rate and the Government
chooses the level of its consumption of final goods, that is treated as an exogenous
variable. We will see in the next section how we can model a more active role of both
these agents.
2.1 Households
The member of each household may be either workers or bankers. Workers supply
labor to firms in exchange for wages, while each banker runs a bank. Wages and profits
from the banking activity are transferred to households and within each family there
is perfect consumption insurance. The fractions(f) of workers and (1− f) of bankers
within each household are constant through all the periods.
Because banks are finitely lived19, in each period a fraction 1 − σ of banks closes.
Therefore, the bankers who run them become workers and, on the opposite, the same
number of workers becomes bankers20. When a bank is closed, the banker transfers all
the remaining equity to household that will provide the starting capital for new bankers.
Following standard assumptions, then, firms are entirely owned by households.
Households get utility from consumption and leisure, are characterized by internal
habits and can save acquiring bank’s deposits and pays lump sum taxes.
Their objective function, therefore, is defined as:
Et
∞∑
t=0
βtet
[
ln (C − ϕCt−1)t − ν
L1+εt
1 + ε
]
(1)
with C consumption and L the fraction of time devoted to work. v the weight of
labor dis-utility equal to the elasticity of leisure, ε the inverse of Frish elasticity to labor
supply, ϕ the habits parameter and βt is a discount factor. Finally et is a preference
shock, that follows an AR(1) process.
If we define Dh the deposits in one type of bank, R
D
t the interest rate granted on
them in each period21, T the taxes paid22, W the nominal wage, Π the profits of firms
19In each period there is a probability σ that a bank closes.
20The workers becoming bankers are, following the assumptions, (1− σ) f .
21It will be proved that the interest rate on deposits is equal to the risk-less interest rate in the
equilibrium.
22Following the well established literature on this topic, started with Ramsey [1927], taxes are
assumed to be a lump-sum.
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and banks transferred to families23 and Pt the price level, it is possible to define the
budget constraint as:
Ct +Dh,t+1 +
Tt
Pt
≤ Wt
Pt
Lt +
Πt
Pt
+
RDt Dh,t
Pt
(2)
from the solution of the households decision problem, it is possible to derive the
following equilibrium conditions:
et
Ct − ϕCt−1 − ϕβ
et+1
Ct+1 − ϕCt = λ
C
t (3)
vLt =
Wt
Pt
λCt (4)
Etβ
tλ
C
t+1
λCt
RDt
Pt
= 1 (5)
Ct +Dh,t+1 +
Tt
Pt
=
Wt
Pt
Lt +
Πt
Pt
+
RDt Dh,t
Pt
(6)
with
{
λCt
}∞
t=0
the sequence of Lagrangian multipliers associated to the optimization
problem, that can also be used to define a stochastic discount factor ΛCt = β
tEt
(
λCt+1
λCt
)
.
Equations (3) and (4) describe the optimal choice of consumption and leisure, and
link together the choice of consumption and hours devoted to work. They also describe
the demand of goods and the supply of labor. Equation (5) describes the Euler condition
on deposits and says that the risk-less rate must be such that it equalities the present
discounted marginal utility of future consumption with the marginal utility of present
consumption. The last equation allows us to determine the value of deposits in t+1
given the optimal choice of all the other variables and the constants.
2.2 Firms
The real sector of the economy is populated by good producers, retailers and capital
producers. Good producers operate in perfect competition and produce homogenous
23Πt = Π
B
t + Π
F
t , with Π
B the dividends of banks and ΠF the profits of firms.
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goods that sell to the retailers. Retailers, with negligible costs, differentiate the goods
and sell them to consumers. However, following the Calvo formalism24, only a fraction
(1− θR) of retailers is able to rest its optimum price at each time t, the remaining
retailers θR will keep the price of the previous period. I define Xt =
Pt
PWt
the mark-up
of retailers price over good producers price. Capital producers produce capital using
undepreciated capital and a fraction of total output as input for a capital producing
technology.
2.2.1 Good Producers
Good producers operate in perfect competition and produce homogeneous goods that
sell at a price PWt to retailers. In order to produce, they combine labor and capital
with a Cobb-Douglass production function:
Yt = AtK
α
t L
(1−α)
t 0 < α < 1 (7)
with A, the total factor productivity, that evolves following an AR(1) process. Firms
acquire labor from households and loans to banks in order to acquire capital from capital
producers. Goods producers, in addition, are not able to accumulate capital so they
need to completely refinance it in every period.
The total cost function is given by:
TC =
Wt
Pt
Lt + ZtKt (8)
with Z the gross profits for unit of capital. From the firm’s optimization problem
it is possible to derive the following first order conditions:
1
Xt
(1− α) Yt
Lt
= λft
Wt
Pt
(9)
1
Xt
α
Yt
Kt
= λftZt (10)
24Calvo [1983].
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with
{
λft
}∞
t=0
the sequence of Lagrangian multipliers associated to the optimization
problem. Equation (9) defines the demand for labor, while equation (10) defines the
gross profits per unit of capital. Firms do not accumulate capital, so in each period
they have to finance their investment with loans acquired from the banking system.
As long as they are able to obtain that funds, they do not face any other friction and
commit to pay to the creditor bank the gross profits per unit of capital. Each unit of
equity, in other words, is a claim to the future returns on one unit of investments:
Zt+1, (1− δK)Zt+2, (1− δK)2 Zt+3 . . .
δK describes the rate of depreciation of capital. Because good producers operate in
perfect competition, they earn 0 profits in the equilibrium. Given this assumption, it
is possible to define the rate of returns on each unit of financed equity, that is given by:
Rh,Kt =
[
Zt + (1− δK)Qht
]
Qht
(11)
with h = i, n that defines if a firm is operating on an area with new investment
opportunities or not. The rate of returns on each unit of capital, therefore, is given by
the gross profits plus capital gains or losses.
In each period, as we know, there is a probability pii that firms on an area have new
investment opportunities and, on the contrary, a probability pin that they have not. It
is possible, then, to define a law of motion of capital as follows:
Kt+1 = ψt+1
{[
It + pi
i (1− δK)Kt
]
+ pin (1− δK)Kt
}
= ψt+1 {It + (1− δK)Kt} (12)
with I the value of new investments. Therefore, the aggregate demand for loans on
each type of area is given by:
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Sht =
 pi
n (1− δK)Kt for h = n
pii (1− δK)Kt + It for h = i
(13)
firms on ”i” areas will need funds to refinance the already existing capital plus new
investment projects that they are able to undertake. On the contrary, firms on ”n”
areas have no new investment projects and will need liquidity only to refinance the
depreciated capital of the previous period.
2.2.2 Retailers
Retailers acquire undifferentiated wholesale goods and transform them into a differ-
entiated final good. Their marginal cost of production is equal to the price of the
undifferentiated good, therefore it is PWt .
Differentiated goods, then, are bundled together so that they can be sold to con-
sumers at the price Pt.
Retailers, therefore, face a standard Dixit-Stiglitz25 demand function that can easily
be computed given a CES aggregator of output:
Yt =
[ˆ 1
0
Y
−1

j,t dj
] 
−1
(14)
with  the elasticity of substitution between different final goods and the aggregate
price level given by: Pt =
[´ 1
0
P 1−j,t
] 1
1− .
Therefore the demand function is given by:
Yj,t =
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−
Yt (15)
In each period there is an exogenous probability that a retailer is able to reset its
price. If that is the case he will set the new price Pj,t = P
∗
j,t in order to maximize future
expected profits. On the contrary he will keep the same price of the previous period
(Pj,t = Pj,t−1). More formally he solves:
∞∑
i=0
Et−1
[
θiRΛ
C
t
(
P ∗j,t − PWt+i
Pt+i
)
Yj,t+i
]
subject to the demand function given by equation (15).
The first order condition is:
25Dixit and Stiglitz [1977].
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∞∑
i=0
Et−1
θiRΛCt
(
P ∗j,t
Pt+i
)−
Yj,t+i
[
P ∗j,t
Pt+i
− 
− 1
PWt+i
Pt+i
] = 0 (16)
with the aggregate price level given by:
Pt =
[
θRP
1−
t−1 + (1− θR)P ∗1−j,t
] 1
1− (17)
given that all firms are equal, they will choose the same price, so we can drop the
index and call P ∗t = P
∗
j,t. Combining (16) with (17) and log-linearizing around the zero
inflation steady state of the model, we get a New-Keynesian Phillips curve that has the
form of:
pit = Et−1 (βpi+1 − kxt) (18)
with pit the inflation rate and k ≡ 1−θRθR (1− θRβ).
2.2.3 Capital goods producers
Capital goods producers operate on a national market and make new capital using
old (undepreciated) capital and a fraction of final output as input of their production
process. They, therefore, are able to produce new capital using a technology described
by:
f
(
It
Kt
)
Kt
this function can be seen also as the description of physical adjustments cost in
the production process of new capital, and idea that is present in the literature since
Kiyotaki and Moore [1997]26, with f ′ (•) > 0, f ′′ (•) < 0 and f (0) = 0. In this way
the production function has decreasing returns to scale in the short run and constant
returns to scale in the long run. The price at which these agents sell the new capital is
driven to Qit
27 by the perfect competition assumption. Capital goods producers choose
It in order to maximize expected profits. Their problem is given by:
26The presence of physical adjustment costs is widespread in the literature, for example can be seen
Friedman and Woodford [2011], Dib [2010] and Angeloni and Faia [2009].
27New capital can be sold only on areas with new investments and the price of capital, due to the
perfect competition assumption, is driven to its market value.
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maxEt
∞∑
t=0
βtΛCt
Qitf
(
It
Kt
)
Kt − It −
∑
h=i,n
[(
Qht −Qht
)
(1− δ) pihKt−1
] (19)
because households are the only owners of firms, the discount factor is given by
ΛCt
28.
∑
h=i,n
[(
Qht −Qht
)
(1− δ) pihKt−1
]
defines the undepreciated capital acquired by
capital producers and is the sum of the capital existing on each area in the previous
period; Qht is the price at which old capital is acquired on each area, that, by perfect
competition, is driven to the price of capital on each area.
From the solution of this problem, it is possible to derive the following equilibrium
condition:
Qit =
[
f ′
(
It
Kt
)]−1
(20)
the above equation has the role of a Tobin’s Q equation29 for the model and allows
to endogenize the price of equity. It’s log-linearized version is given by:
qit = f (it − kt−1) (21)
2.3 Financial system
The financial system is populated by finitely lived banks each of them run by a banker.
Each bank is endowed with an initial capital from households and collects deposits on
a national market. If needed, banks can also access a national interbank market where
they exchange funds between them.
With the funds raised each bank can provide loans to firms, acquire risk-less assets
or supply loans to other banks on the interbank market.
It is worth remembering that banks can lend to firms only at local level, so each
bank can lend only to firms located on its same area, while they can access national
28ΛCt = βEt
(
λCt+1
λCt
)
defines the households discount factor and is a function of the real marginal
utility of consumption.
29Brainard and Tobin [1968], Tobin [1969].
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markets for deposits and interbank loans30.
Therefore, we can describe the assets of a bank as the sum of loans to firms, bonds
and interbank loans; on the liability side, we have bank’s capital, deposits and interbank
loans:
Assets Liabilities
Loans to firms Capital
Interbank loans Deposits
Risk-less Assets Interbank debts
note that interbank loans appear on both sides of the balance sheet. In fact, they
are an asset for banks with surplus of funds, that lend on the interbank market and a
liability for those banks that borrow on the interbank market.
We also know that in each area of the economy there is an exogenous probability
pii that new investment opportunities arises for firms. If there are new investment
possibilities on the area where the bank operates, it will face an higher demand for
loans because firms, on top of refinancing already installed capital, want to borrow to
invest.
However, the type of area on which a bank operates is revealed after that banks have
chosen the optima level of deposits. Therefore, because banks will choose an average
level of deposits, some banks (those on areas of the ”i” type) will need more funds, while
others (those on areas of ”n” type) will have an excess of liquidity. This hypothesis
reflect the fact that banks collect deposits before knowing the exact amount of the
demand they will face and this is one of the reasons why exists an interbank market.
On this market banks will be able to exchange funds to overcome their shortage or
excess of liquidity.
In a perfect, frictionless, market banks with excess of liquidity will borrow to banks
on ”i” areas and the total credit supplied by the banking system will be equal to the
sum of bank’s net worth and deposit, reaching the maximum level possible.
However, as we have seen in the last years, banks with excess of liquidity may
decide not to borrow on the interbank market. Their behavior will be a key aspect of
the model. As we will see later, lending banks on the interbank market can decide to
invest their excess of liquidity on interbank lendings or on risk-less assets; when the
economy faces a crisis, lending banks may decide to invest all their excess liquidity on
30This assumption follows what proposed in Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010].
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risk-less assets, not financing any interbank loan and causing a reduction of credit to
firms and so a worsening of the crisis.
What is important to understand now, is that only banks on areas without new
investment decide to invest part of their funds on the interbank market or on risk-less
assets, because, as long as there are investment projects to be financed, it is more
convenient to invest on them31. This result will be proven later in the model. Before
moving on, I believe, it might be useful to provide a description of the time line of the
model:
Finally I assume that there is some degree of uncertainty on the returns of loans
issued to firms on new investment island. What I am saying is that those returns
are subject to a shock. This shock takes the form of a stochastic variable xi,t with
E (xi,t) = 0, V ar (xi,t) = σx > 0 that spans on an interval [−h;h] with a uniform
distribution and probability 1
2h
32.
We know that banks pay dividends to households only when they end their activity,
that can occur in each period with a probability σ33. When a bank exits the market,
the banker transfers all the accumulated net worth to households; in all the previous
periods, it is optimal for him to accumulate profits34 to increase the bank’s net worth.
The objective of the banker, then, is to maximize the sum that he can transfer to
households at the end of each period. Because he runs the bank, I assume that he can
divert to households a part of the total funds intermediated by the bank that are equal
to the total value of assets
(
Ah,Bt
)
except for those acquired on the interbank market35,
leading to the default of the bank.
31This particular result is in line what with discussed in Stiglitz and Greenwald [2003].
32For the modelization of the shock I followed Angeloni and Faia [2009] and Diamond and Rajan
[2001].
33This assumption is necessary to avoid that banks accumulate enough capital to become financially
unconstrained.
34The banking system operates in perfect competition, for profits I intend the returns on the invested
capital.
35I am assuming that private banks are more efficient in monitoring their counterparts than depos-
itors.
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The banker, in each period, decides to divert assets if, doing so, the value of the
transfer he makes to household is higher than the value of the bank, given by the
expected net worth at the end of the period
(
nht+1
)
. We can simply define their objective
function of a manager as:
V ht = max
{
Et
(
nht+1
)
; θ
(
Ah,Bt
)}
(22)
with
Ah,Bt =
 Q
i
ts
i
t − bt for h = i
Qnt s
n
t + bt + ft for h = n
with sht the volume of loans to firms emitted by each type of bank whose value is
Qht , bt the value of interbank loans (that are an asset for lending banks and a liability
for borrowing banks), ft the value of risk-less assets and θ the fraction of assets that
bankers can divert.
Ai,Bt defines the total divertible funds for banks on area ”i”, that are equal to the
value of funds they intermediate minus interbank loans. As will be proven later on,
those banks have on the assets side only loans to firms and will not invest on risk-less
assets. In addition, given the assumption on the structure of the interbank market,
banks can not divert the funds borrowed on it, so the divertible assets in this case are
equal to the total value of loans minus the interbank loans acquired.
An,Bt defines the values of divertible funds from bank on area ”n”, equal to the
amount of funds intermediated. These banks use their funds to provide loans to firm,
to acquire risk-less assets and to lend on the interbank market. Therefore, the total
value of funds they intermediate is equal to the tonal value of their assets that is
Qnt s
n
t + bt + ft. Finally, there is not index of areas on bt and ft. This is due to the
fact that interbank loans are considered a liability for banks on areas ”i” and an asset
for those on areas ”n”, but they are the same asset, so there is no need for any index.
Similarly, as I will prove, only banks on areas ”n” will acquire risk-less assets, so there
is no need, in this case, to use an index.
The expected net worth of each type of bank, at the end of the period, is given by
the sum of the net worth at the beginning of the period plus the returns on the banking
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activity.
From equation (22) it is straightforward to see how arises an agency problem. In
fact, the bank’s creditors will not lend to the banker an amount of funds high enough to
make Et
(
nht+1
)
< θ
(
Ah,Bt
)
, because, in this case, the banker will divert a fraction θ of
the active, the bank will default, and they will lost the loan. For this reason, we end up
having an additional constraint on the bank’s activity, that states that in each period
the volume of funds “divertible” by the banker must be smaller than the expected value
of the bank’s net worth at the end of the period. As long as it holds, bankers will not
divert any part of the funds they are intermediating. It is possible, so, to define two
incentive constraints, one for each type of bank:
Et
(
nit+1
)
≥ θ
(
Qits
i
t − bt
)
(23)
Et
(
nnt+1
)
≥ θ (Qnt snt + bt + ft) (24)
the last thing to do before formally analyze the decision problem of banks in each
of the two possible state of the world is to formally define the bank’s budget constraint,
that is given by:
Qits
i
t = n
i
t + dt + bt (25)
Qnt s
n
t + bt + ft = n
n
t + dt (26)
again, note that interbank loans are a liability for one type of banks and an asset
for the other. Again, I could have allowed for risk-less assets in the budget of both
banks but, as I said, it will be proven later on that only banks on areas ”n” acquire
those assets.
2.3.1 Banks on areas with new investment possibilities
Banks on these areas do not have enough funds to supply all the credit demanded
by firms, and so they have to ask for interbank loans. We also know that there is a
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stochastic variables that affects the effective returns on loans to firms. As long as the
constraint given by equation (23) is satisfied, bankers that operate on this type of areas
will have the objective to maximize the expected net worth at the end of each period.
We can, finally, formally define the net-worth at the end of each period for this type of
banks as:
Et
(
nit+1
)
= Et
[(
Ri,Kt + xi,t
)
Qits
i
t −RBt bt −RDt dt + nit
]
(27)
with Ri,Kt the expected returns on loans to firms between t and t+1 defined as
[Zt+(1−δK)Qit]
Qit
, dt the deposits acquired by each bank and R
B
t the interbank interest rate
between t and t+1. The objective function of this type of banks can be defined as:
Et
∞∑
t=0
ΛBt n
i
t+1 (28)
ΛBt ≡ (1− σ)σtΛCt
Et
(
nit+1
)
= Ri,Kt Q
i
ts
i
t −RBt bt −RDt dt + nit
because banks are owned by households, the discount factor of bank’s profits is given
by ΛCt .
The decision problem of the representative bank can be defined as the maximization
of equation (28) under the constraints given by equations (23) and (25).
The solution to that problem leads to the following equilibrium conditions36:
Ri,Kt −RBt = 0 (29)
RBt −RDt =
λitθ
ΛBt (1 + λ
i
t)
(30)
36If we take the expectation it is true that Et
(
Ri,Kt + xi,t
)
= Ri,Kt .
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Ri,Kt Q
i
ts
i
t −RBt bt −RDt dt + nit ≥ θ
(
Qits
i
t − bt
)
(31)
with {λit}∞t=0 the sequence of Lagrangian multipliers associated to the problem. It
is trivial to show how the solution to the problem is a corner solution. Equation (29)
defines an Euler condition for banks on areas with new investments, and defines the
interest rate on the interbank market. As long as it is satisfied, banks on this type
of areas will acquire all the interbank credit supplied. Equation (30) defines the risk-
less rate as a mark down on the interbank market rate. Combined with the previous
equation it is also defined as a mark down on the real returns on investments. The last
relation is the incentive constraint that holds with the equality if λit > 0. It is possible to
show how that relation must hold with equality, in order to maximize banker’s profits.
Proposition 1. The incentive constraint must hold with equality to maximize profits.
Proof. Assume that equation (31) holds with inequality. In this case, we have that
Ri,Kt = R
B
t and R
B
t = R
D
t from equations (29) and (30). It is possible to compute
profits for the bank as:
Πit|λit=0 = R
i,k
t Q
i
ts
i
t −RBt b−RDt dt = Ri,kt Qitsit −RBt (bt + dt)
using the budget constraint we get:
Πit|λit=0 = R
i,k
t Q
i
ts
i
t −RBt
(
Qits
i
t − nit
)
= Ri,Kt n
i
t
On the contrary, if we assume that λit > 0, we have that R
i,K
t = R
B
t but R
B
t > R
D
t .
So, profits become (substituting the budget constraint into the profit function):
Πit|λit>0 = R
i,k
t Q
i
ts
i
t −RBt b−RDt d = Ri,kt Qitsit −RDt dt −RBt
(
Qits
i
t − nit − dt
)
that can be simplified into:
Πit|λit>0 =
(
RBt −RDt
)
dt +R
i,K
t n
i
t
because, according to equation (30), RBt > R
D
t if λ
i
t > 0, Π
i
t|λit>0 > Π
i
t|λit=0. So the
incentive constraint must be biding in order to maximize profits. This proof is in line
with the standard result of agency theory.
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Proposition 2. Banks on area with new investment possibilities do not buy risk-less
assets
Proof. Consider the equilibrium conditions described by equations (29) and (30). They
state that Ri,kt = R
B
t > R
D
t . Therefore, banks on areas with new investment opportu-
nities will not use their initial funds to acquire risk-less assets, because the expected
returns on loans to firms are higher. Similarly, they won’t borrow from the interbank
market to buy risk-less assets, because they will incur in losses. Therefore banks on
this area won’t invest in risk-less assets, in line with the conclusions of Stiglitz and
Greenwald [2003].
We can plug equation (31) into it the budget constraint to get to:
τ itn
i
t +$
i
tbt = φ
i
tQ
i
ts
i
t (32)
with τ ≡
(
RDt + 1
)
, $ ≡
(
RDt + θ −RBt
)
, φ ≡
(
RDt + θ −Ri,Kt
)
. The previous
equation defines the supply of loans to firms on areas with new investments. As it can
be seen, it depends positively from the total amount of interbank borrowing received
by banks on this type of areas. If bt = 0, it is just defined as a mark-up on the bank’s
net worth at the beginning of each period.
2.3.2 Banks on areas without new investment possibilities
The analysis of the choice for banks that end up operating on areas without new
investments is a bit more complicated.
In fact they can invest in loans to firms and banks or in risk-less assets. In addition,
there is the effect of the stochastic shock that influences, as it will be explained later on,
the returns on interbank loans. If the realization of the shock is sufficiently small, the
debtor bank is not able to refund the total value of the loans received and it defaults.
In that case, of course, the creditor will receive less or nothing of the original value of
the loan. We can start analyzing how the variable xi,t influences the choice of lending
banks. As long as the realized value of the shock is positive, so it falls in the interval
[0;h], banks on investment areas have no problem to pay back their debts. On the
contrary, if xi,t ∈ [−h; 0), “borrowing” banks on the interbank market may not be
able to refund all their creditors. If the shock falls in that interval, banks have to use
part of the net worth accumulated in the previous periods to pay back their debts. As
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always, depositors are refunded first and only after them, with what is left, are refunded
interbank loans.
From this assumption we can define a critical values of the shock. It defines the
lowest value of xi,t that sill allows the debtor bank to refund all its creditors using all
the net worth accumulated in the previous periods. We can define the first critical value
of the shock as that value that drives to zero the bank’s assets after that the creditors
are paid:
0 =
(
Ri,Kt + xi,t
)
Qits
i
t + n
i
t −RDt dt −RBt bt
we can solve for xi,t and call that value at:
at =
bitR
B
t − nit +RDt dt
Qits
i
t
−Ri,Kt (33)
it is possible to see how this value grows as the cost of borrowing grows and decreases
in the value of the assets of banks on investment areas and in the returns on the firm’s
capital.
Intuitively, banks with larger net worth and higher average returns are more robust
to adverse shock, so the value of the shock a that leads to a default is lower. In parallel,
the more a bank is leveraged (so the higher its deposits and interbank loans) the more
easily also limited shocks can erode its net worth and lead to a default.
In case the realization of the shock is lower than at, the lending bank gets 0 and the
borrowing bank defaults.
It is straightforward to define a payment distribution function for the lending bank,
that describes the expected returns on interbank loans:
Ft = 1
2h
aˆ
−h
0dxi,t +
1
2h
hˆ
a
RBt btdxi,t (34)
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Distribution of returns on interbank loans
We can now define the value of the net worth at the end of each period, for a
representative bank on an area without new investment possibilities that is given by:
Etn
n
t+1 = n
n
t +R
n,K
t ψtQ
n
t s
n
t + Ft +RFt ft −RDt dt (35)
with RFt the risk-less interest rate that is equal to the interest rate on deposits.
Before moving on to analyze the optimization problem, it is useful to prove that
banks on areas without new investment opportunities do not borrow money from the
interbank market. This will allow us to clarify and simplify the optimization problem
that will be presented later on. In fact, if a bank on these areas was interested in
borrowing from the interbank market, it would contradicting equations (25) and (26).
Proposition 3. Banks on areas without new investment do not borrow from the inter-
bank market.
Proof. Assume that a bank borrows from the interbank market. Its objective function
would be:
maxEt
∞∑
t=0
ΛBt n
n
t+1 (36)
ΛBt ≡ (1− σ)σtβtΛCt
with
22
Etn
n
t+1 = n
n
t +R
n,K
t Q
n
t s
n
t +R
F
t ft −RDt dt −RBt bt (37)
we know that nnt + dt ≤ Qnt snt . This bank, therefore, has sufficient funds in each
period to finance loans to firms; in addition, given that in these areas there are not
additional investment opportunities, the bank can not supply more credit to firms so
is not interested in acquiring additional resources for that on the interbank market.
Additional funds, so, can only be invested in risk-less assets.
In this case, the bank pays RBt for sure on each dollar acquired on the interbank
market and gets RFt from its investment in bonds. But given equation (30) we know that
RBt < R
F
t , therefore banks on these areas do not borrow from the interbank market.
Coming back to the original problem, the objective function of this type o banks is
given by:
Et
∞∑
t=0
ΛBt n
n
t+1 (38)
this function is to be maximized under the constraints given by equations (24) and
(26). The first order conditions of the problem are:
Rn,Kt −RFt = 0 (39)
this equation states that as long as the real interest rates paid on loans to firms on
areas without new investments is at least as large as the risk-less rate, banks will supply
all the credit demanded from the private sector. This means that as long as there is
demand for loans, banks will use their liquidity to finance them and not interbank loans.
The optimum condition on deposits is given by:
RFt −RDt =
λnt θ
ΛBt (1 + λ
n
t )
(40)
with {λnt }∞t=0 the sequence of Lagrangian multipliers associated to the problem. This
equation describes the relation between the risk-less rate and the deposit rate. In order
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to verify the non arbitrage condition, it follows that λnt = 0 ∀t.
Until now we have derived the supply of loans, that is equal to the demand, for
areas without new investments and the condition at which banks acquire deposits from
households. It is necessary now to find what use banks on this type of areas make
of their excess liquidity, that remains them after that they have served all firms. It is
possible to derive the optimum condition for the supply of interbank loans, for a generic
bank, that is given by:
1
2h
[
RBt h−RBt at − btRBt
RBt
Qits
i
t
]
−RFt = 0 (41)
from which follows that:
b∗t =
Qits
i
t
2hRBt
[
RBt (h− at)−RFt
]
interbank loans are a fraction of total loans on areas with new investments. Their
amount decrease as risk increases (the parameter a gets closer to h) and in the risk-
less interest rate that is the opportunity cost of each dollar invested in the interbank
market.
We can now compute the equilibrium value of risk-less assets held by each bank of
this type from the budget constraint, that is given by:
f ∗t = n
n
t + dt −Qnt snt − b∗t (42)
at last, it is also possible to define the probability of a default(δ) to occur37, simply
as the probability of a shock to fall in the interval [−h; a]:
δt =
1
2h
aˆ
−h
1dxi,t =
1
2h
(at + h) + εd (43)
37For a default I intend a default on a loan, so also the case that a bank defaults on a loan but uses
its net worth to refund the creditor.
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as it can be seen, because at is a negative number, the probability of default increases
as the dispersion of revenues increases. In addition, we can see how in each period the
probability of default is defined by the financial conditions of debtor banks. εd is a
shock on the probability of default that follows an AR(1) process.
2.3.3 Aggregation
Because the condition of banking and the choices of banks are different depending on
the type of area on which they operate in each period, it is not possible to aggregate
through all the areas, but we can do so only between banks on the same area.
We can start from banks on areas without new investments (capital letters define
aggregate variables). As they are all equal between them, it is possible to aggregate
through them, to get to the supply function of loans to firms, that is given by:
Snt =
1
Qnt
(Nnt + pi
nDt −Bt − Ft) (44)
with, according to equation (13), Snt = pi
n (1− δK)Kt and Nnt = pinNt.
The total supply of interbank loans is given by:
B∗t =
QitS
i
t
2hRBt
[
RBt (h− a)−RFt
]
(45)
and the total value of risk-less assets by:
F ∗t = N
n
t +Dt −Qnt Snt −B∗t (46)
on the other type of areas, the total supply of loans to firms is given by:
τ itN
i
t +$
i
tB
∗
t = φ
i
tQ
i
tS
i
t (47)
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with, according to equation (13), Sit = pi
i (1− δK)Kt + It and N it = piiNt. It is
easy to see how the value of the previous relationship is influenced by equation (45). In
this way, the choices of lending banks directly influences the supply of credit to firms
and, because firms relay completely on bank’s loans to finance their activity, the level
of output, employment and consumption of the system.
Before moving on to the next section, we must define a low of motion for bank’s
capital. In each period, on each type of areas, the bank’s net worth at the end of the
period is equal to the sum of the capital accumulated in the previous periods plus the
gain or losses from the banking activity. At the end of the period, however, a fraction
of banks quits and, therefore, the value of their capital is transferred to households who
supply the initial capital for new banks. Therefore, at the beginning of the new period,
the aggregate bank’s net worth is given by the sum of the bank’s capital at the end
of the period, minus the capital of the banks that have quit plus the transfers from
households to new banks. We can set up the equality:
Nt = N
o
t−1 +N
y
t−1 (48)
with Nt the bank’s capital at the beginning of each period, N
o
t−1 the bank’s capital of
surviving banks and Nyt−1 the bank’s capital of new banks, that is equal to the transfers
received from households. It is straightforward to define the transfer as a fraction of
total loans intermediated:
Nyt = ξ
{
pii
[
Zt + (1− δQ)Qit
]
Sit + pi
n [Znt + (1− δQ)Qnt ]Snt
}
(49)
with ξ a positive parameter smaller than 1.
The capital of surviving banks is equal to the value of the capital of banks that
survives from t-1 to t, that is given by N ot = σ
(
N o,it +N
o,n
t
)
. The previous relation
simply equals the value of net worth of surviving banks to the sum of the net worth on
each area. These values, of course, are influenced by the effective returns on investments,
and so by the realization of the stochastic shock. So, the net worth of banks on areas
”i” is given by:
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N o,it =
1
2h
aˆ
−h
0dxi,t +
1
2h
hˆ
a
[
Ri,Kt + xi,t
]
QitS
n
t dxi,t + pi
iNt − piiRFt Dt −RBt Bt (50)
the first integer describes the case in which the bank defaults as a consequence of
the realization of the shock. Similarly, it is possible to define N o,nt as the sum of the
capital at the beginning of the period plus the returns on the investments. Therefore,
we can set up the equality:
N o,nt = R
n,k
t Q
n
t S
n
t − pinRFt Dt + ΠBt +RFt Ft + pinNt (51)
with ΠBt−1 the profits on interbank loans that are defined as:
1
2h
aˆ
−h
0dxi,t +
1
2h
hˆ
a
RBt Btdxi,t (52)
the value of bank’s capital at the beginning of each period on each type of area is
given by piiNt = N
i
t for areas with new investment opportunities and pi
nNt = N
n
t for
areas without new investment opportunities.
2.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium on the goods market is given by the well-known relationship:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + εg (53)
if we plug in the optimal values of consumption and investments, we obtain an IS
curve augmented for the adjustment costs. On the supply side of the good market, the
supply is defined by the firms production function, given by equation (7), after having
plugged in the optimal values of labor and capital. εg is a government spending shock
that follows an AR(1) process.
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The equilibrium on the credit market is granted by equations (13), (20), (45), (46),
(44) and (47); while on the labor market by equations (4) and (9). The total volume of
risk-less assets in the economy is given by the sum of deposits and government securities
acquired by banks:
DTt = Dt + Ft (54)
Finally, total deposits are given by:
Dt =
∑
h=i,n
(
Qht S
h
t −Nht
)
(55)
while the Central Bank follows a Taylor-type rule:
rft = ψpipit + ψyYt + εr (56)
with ψpi and ψy the sensitivity of the monetary policy rule to inflation and output
and εr a monetary policy shock that follows an AR(1) process.
3 Data
To estimate the model we use a data set composed by 5 key macroeconomic variables.
The data are U.S. quarterly time series for: the log difference of real GDP, real con-
sumption, real investment, interbank lendings and inflation. All data are detrended
and are related to the model by the measurement equations:
dlGDPt
dlCONSt
dlINVt
dlINTt
dlPt

=

yt − yt−1
ct − ct−1
it − it−1
bt − bt−1
pit

All data are obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce - Bureau of Economic
Analysis databank.
Real GDP Product is expressed in Billions of Chained 1996 Dollars. Nominal Per-
sonal Consumption Expenditures, Fixed Private Domestic Investment and Interbank
Loans are deflated with the GDP-deflator. These variables are expressed per capita
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by dividing for the population over 16 and in 100 times log, following the procedure
adopted also in Smets and Wouters [2003] and Smets and Wouters [2007]. All series
are detrended and seasonally adjusted.
The inflation rate is expressed on a quarterly basis corresponding with their appear-
ance in the model.
4 Estimation
The log-linearized version of the model can be written as:
AEt (Yt+1) = BYt + CEt
where A, B and C are matrices of parameters, Yt a vector of endogenous variables
and Et a vector of the shocks of the autoregressive processes.
Using a Schur decomposition, it is possible to solve the model and write it in its
state space form, that is:
Xt+1 = Λ1Xt + Λ2εt (57)
with Λ1 and Λ2 matrices of combinations of the deep parameters of the model, Xt+1
the law of motion of states variables and εt a vector of shocks.
Finally the measurement equations can be defined as:
Yt = Λ0Xt (58)
Combining (57) and (58) it is possible to set up a Kalman filter to recover the
likelihood of the model.
4.1 Bayesian Estimation
Following Gerali et al. [2010] and Darracq Paries et al. [2011], we estimate a subset of
the deep parameters of the model.
We calibrate the households discount factor β to its standard value in the literature
of 0.99. Capital depreciation δ is set to 0.025 while, following Gertler and Kiyotaki
[2010], pii is set to 0.25. The steady state default rate on the interbank market is set to
0.003 according to the long run average bank defaults provided by Moody’s38 while the
38For more details see Moody’s [2009].
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variance of the returns on investment projects h is set to 0.5 following the calibration
proposed in Angeloni and Faia [2009] that is based on the estimation of returns carried
on in Bloom et al. [2012]. ν is set to 0.6 following Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010]. σ, the
surviving probability of banks, is set to 0.972 leading to an average surviving time of
10 years. The steady state ration of C
Y
, I
Y
and G
Y
are calibrated to 0.62, 0.18 and 0.2
respectively. The steady state output to capital ration is set to 3, that is the average
value in advanced economies. θ is set to 0.129 after Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010] and
the Calvo parameter θR to 0.75 following the New Keynesian literature.
The remaining deep parameters of the model are estimated following the procedure
proposed in Smets and Wouters [2007]. In particular, through the Bayes rule, the
posterior distribution of the model’s parameters Ψ is approximated to the likelihood
times the prior distribution, according to the well-known relation:
p (Ψ | Y ) ∝ L (Y | Ψ) p (Ψ) (59)
with Ψ = [σεe , σεA , σεd , σεr , σεg , ρe, ρA, ρd, ρr, ρd, α, ϕ, ε, f, θ, θR, ψy, ψpi]
T . Given
that does not exists a close form solution for (59), the equation is evaluated with a
MCMC algorithm repeated for 2 chains with 1’000’000 draws each. Convergence diag-
nostics can be found in the appendix.
4.2 Prior Choices
Following Smets and Wouters [2007], the standard errors for the shocks processes are
assumed to follow an inverse gamma distribution with mean of 0.01 and a standard
error of 2.
We select a beta distribution for the autoregressive components of the shock process
with mean 0.5 and a standard error of 0.2. The technology parameter α is assumed to
follow a beta distribution with mean 0.33 and a 0.05 standard error.
The parameters of the utility function, ϕ and ε, follow a beta distribution with
mean of 0.5 and 0.1 and standard errors of 0.1 and 0.01.
f follows a beta distribution with mean 0.25 and standard error of 0.1. The mean for
f is chosen according to the steady value of the same parameter proposed in Bernanke
et al. [1999].
Finally the two policy parameters follows a gamma distribution with mean 0.8 and
1.5 and standard error of 0.2 and 0.5 respectively.
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4.3 Estimation Results
Estimation results are reported in table 2 of the appendix. Results are generally in
line with the previous literature. The sensitivity of the policy function to inflation is
larger than to output; the technology and preference parameters are in line with other
results in the literature and autocorrelation coefficients are generally high as in Smets
and Wouters [2003] and Smets and Wouters [2007].
Surprisingly, f , the parameter associated with the log-linearized Tobin’s Q equation,
is much lower than what calibrated in Bernanke et al. [1999]. To check this result we
performed a specific test on the identification strength that shows that, actually, that
parameter is between the best identified in the model and strengthen our conclusion.
The test is presented in the next section and its results are displayed in the appendix.
4.4 Robustness Check
A recurrent issue in the estimation of DSGE models is the weak identification of param-
eters. Lack of identification is generally due to a flat likelihood caused by a limited or
absent curvature of the function in the area or by the fact that the function itself does
not changes with the parameters. In order to verify the robustness of the estimation
we apply a test for the identification strength based on the Fisher information matrix.
The aim of the test is to verify that the likelihood function has indeed a significant
curvature in the direction of the parameters.
In order to do so, we use the procedure developed in Andrle [2010], Iskrev [2010]
and Iskrev and Ratto [2011]. The measure of sensitivity for a general parameter θi is
given by:
si =
√
θ2i /Ii,i (θ)
−1 (60)
with I (θ) the Fisher information matrix. If this is exactly equal to 1, it means that
the likelihood function is flat and, therefore, the parameter is not well identify. An
alternative approach is to normalize the identification measure using the prior standard
deviation. This second specification is useful as a second check when the value of the
parameter is close to 0 and the previous approach may lead to inaccurate results39. In
this case the measure of sensitivity becomes:
spi = σ (θi) /
√
Ii,i (θ) (61)
39For more details see again Andrle [2010] and Iskrev [2010].
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we produce both graphs (in log scale) to show how the parameters we have estimated
pass those tests. Figure 3 in the appendix shows a graph with on the bars the absolute
values of the test results.
Furthermore it is possible to use a similar procedure to check if the likelihood changes
with changes in the parameters. The index we use are given by:
∆i =
√
θ2i Ii,i (θ)
∆pi = σ (θi)
√
Ii,i (θ)
the result of this test are reported in figure 3 of the appendix. As it can be seen all
parameters are well identified.
Another reason why the parameters in the model may be weakly identified is because
of a lack of information in the data. In order to verify the robustness of our findings
with respect to this possibility we can exploit the information contained in the Jacobin
matrix.
It is possible to measure “locally” the impact of each parameter on each element
mj of the moment vector using the derivatives of the Jacobiam matrix:
∂mj
∂θi
however, derivatives are not scale invariant, therefore we need to normalize them
using the ratio of standard deviations: std(θi)
std(mj)
. In this way we can take into account the
differences in the uncertainty on each parameter and put more weight on parameters
that affect more the likelihood leading to higher changes. In addition in this way we can
compare the impact of each parameter on different volatile moments (see Iskrev and
Ratto [2011] for an extensive proof). In particular, we will going to compare derivatives
of the Jacobin matrices for: the moment matrix, the model solution matrix and the
linear rational expectation matrix. Results are reported in figure 4 of the appendix.
Using the moment matrix we can see how well a parameter is identified due to the
strength of its impact on observed movements while with the model solution matrix
we see how well a parameter could be identified if all state variables were observed.
Comparing these two results we can be sure of the presence of the information we need
in the data set used. Figure 4 in the appendix displays the norms of ∂mj
∂θi
std(θi)
std(mj)
for each
of the three matrices.
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It is also possible to look for the best identified parameters in the model. Again
we star from the Fisher information matrix of the model. We apply a Singular Value
Decomposition of the matrix that leads to40:
Q′1I (θ)Q2 = Σ (62)
with Q1 and Q2 two square matrices of vectors and Σ a diagonal matrix of singular
values σi. This decomposition is a standard way to determine the rank of a matrix and
delivers us eigenvectors that associate each singular value with the estimated parame-
ters. The rank r is equal to:
σ1 ≥ σ2 ≥ . . . ≥ σr > σr+1 = 0
we know that if the Fisher information matrix is rank deficient, i.e. r < min {m,n},
the model is not identified. Figure 5 and 6 in the appendix show the lowest and highest
singular values with associated eigenvectors of parameters. A parameter associated to
a singular value of 0 means that it is completely unidentified and, therefore, causes the
deficiency in the rank of the matrix. Similarly, parameters associated with low singular
values are more close to collinearity and, thus, more weakly identified. On the contrary,
parameters associated with high singular values are the best identified in the model.
For a more extended proof of these results see Andrle [2010].
Figure 2 and 3 deliver the following conclusion: i) there are not unidentified pa-
rameters in the model, ii) the parameter f is between the best identified in the model
and, therefore, our result on its estimation is robust, iii) the variance of the exogenous
shocks appears to be well identified as well.
5 Shock Responses
In this paragraph we will describe how the system answers to shocks of various nature
focusing, in particular, on the supply of credit, aggregate production, investments,
consumption and the stability of the financial system given by the average probability
of default.
As in standard DSGE literature, a positive productivity shock boosts production
and raises inflation even if, in the immediate, inflation declines due to the decrease
40Note that in this special case the Singular Value Decomposition delivers the same results of the
Eigenvalues Decomposition.
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in the hours worked and the consequent increase of the mark up. The Central Banks
reacts accordingly, decreasing the interest rate in the first periods (in which the inflation
effect dominates) and increasing it (on to counterbalance the increase in output and in
inflation). As expected, the price of capital rises.
On the interbank market, the increase in the average returns boosts loans to firms
on both types of areas. In particular, in areas with new investment opportunities this
leads to a decrease in the value of a41 and a consequent decrease in the probability of
default.
Percentage deviation from the steady state as a function of a. As it can be seen, the
deviation in 0 when a is exactly equal to its steady state value a∗. When a > a∗ the
deviation from the steady state computed as a−a
∗
a∗ is negative because a
∗ is negative. On the
opposite, when a < a∗ the deviation is positive.
Banks are willing to lend more because, at the same time, their counterparts are less
fragile, so the “risk” of lending is lower. This fact leads to a decrease in the interbank
interest rate, that is a direct consequence of the decrease of the “zero profits area”
described in equation (34). The combinations of all these facts lead to an increase in
the supply of credit in the interbank market and a decrease of the interbank interest
rate. These events lead to an increase in profitability for banks on areas with new
investments and to a decrease of profits (driven by the reduction of the interbank
interest rate) for banks on areas without new investment opportunities. Therefore, the
41Remember that a is negative in the steady state, so the percentage deviations of a, given by a−assass
are positive if a is smaller than the steady state value and negative in the opposite case.
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first type of bank will increase its net worth above the steady while for the other type
of bank we observe a decrease of the net worth. Given the superior number of banks
of the second type, the aggregate net worth will decrease.
What is most interesting, is that the effects of the increase average returns on
capital and of the decrease of the interbank interest rate dominate the reduction of the
aggregate bank’s net worth, leading to a significant reduction of the default probability
and, therefore, to a more stable financial system. The beneficial effect for the economy
is clearly visible in the increase of investments that boost capital and output. However,
banks in this context have less capital, so the stability of this particular configuration
of the financial system is aleatory. If a shock hits the interbank market or, for any
exogenous or unpredictable reason, some banks default, the financial system is less able
to absorb losses and, therefore, is still fragile to a purely financial shock. Note that the
significant (in magnitude) decrease in the default probability is due to the fact that the
steady state for that variable is very small, equal to 0.003.
A consumers’ preference shock decreases the marginal value of consumption and,
therefore, the actual level of consumption. This dynamic is not compensated by a
sufficiently large increase in the investments leading to a fall in aggregate output. At
the same time, through the labor demand equation (9), the real wage increases pushing
up marginal cost for firms and rising inflation.
However, the change in investment is positive and long lasting, leading to an increase
in the price of assets. This affects the total supply of credit, that goes up, thanks to the
reduction of a, that captures the riskiness on the interbank market. Again, a goes down
affecting equation (34) and banks’ profits. The decrease in a increases the supply on the
interbank market that boosts the total supply of credit. In addition it also reduces the
interbank market interest rate. As observed before, banks on areas with new investment
opportunities increase their profits and, consequently, their net worth. The opposite is
true for banks operating on the other type of areas. This, on the aggregate, leads to a
decrease in the total net worth of banks.
However, the sharp decrease in a reduces the default probability of banks. This
dynamic is similar to what observed in the case of a positive total factor productivity
shock, with the difference that, in this case, the decrease in the default probability is
smaller, as a consequence of a smaller decrease of a.
The consideration expressed in the previous case apply also in the case under con-
sideration.
We can now move to the analysis of the last real shock, an increase of government
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expenditure. In this case, this model departs slightly from the standard literature
featuring a (very) small reduction of inflation following a government spending shock.
This fact, that will be explained more in details later on, is due to the combined effect
of habits, investments rigidity and of the complex financial system.
A positive government spending shock increases total demand, leading to an increase
of production. To increase production firms demand more labor, increasing the total
hours worked and decreasing the real wage. This leads to higher profits and to an
increase of the marginal utility of consumption. To go back to the steady state, given
the habit formation assumption, consumers consume more reinforcing the mechanism.
At the same time, the mark up rises and, so, inflation decreases. The combined effect
of a decrease in inflation and a rise in output leads to a decrease of the Central Bank’s
target rate.
At the same time, due to the reduction in the real wage, firms start to substitute
capital with labor leading to a decrease in the demand of investments. This decrease
leads to a reduction of the price for new capital affecting the value of a. In this scenario
a goes above its steady state value, according to equation (33). As a consequence
the “zero profit area” described in equation (34) increases. The consequence for the
interbank market are easy to predict: the interbank interest rate increases while total
supply of interbank loans decreases. As a consequence, the budget constraint for banks
on areas with new investment opportunities becomes tighter and, so, the supply of loans
to firm decrease. On the opposite with respect to what we have seen in the previous
case, here are the banks that operate on areas without new investment opportunities
that increase their profits, due to the higher returns they are able to obtain from
interbank loans. On the contrary, banks that operate on areas without new investment
opportunities are not able to finance enough new loans to the private sectors, due to
the tighter liquidity constraint they face. In addition, the decrease in the value of assets
decreases their capital gains on loans to firms. However, on the aggregate, total net
worth of the banking system increase because, as always, the increase of net worth of
banks on ”n” areas offsets that of banks on ”i” areas, due to the larger number of the
firsts.
Finally the default probability increases, even if slightly. This is due, of course, to
the increased value of a.
We can now turn to pure financial shocks: an interest rate shock and a default
probability shock.
A positive interest rate shock slightly increases λC leading to a small increase in
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consumption that, however, dies out quickly over time. As in standard New-Keynesian
literature it reduces output and inflation. Both these phenomenon can be explained by
the increase in the mark-up and the decrease in capital, investment and real wages.
In fact, as the risk less rate increases for banks becomes more convenient to invest
excess liquidity in risk less asset rather than on the interbank market. Therefore the
supply of interbank credit decreases and liquidity constraints become tighter for banks
on areas with new investments. This leads to a decrease of loans granted on both types
of areas due to the tighter constraints and, therefore, the reduction of available funds.
The immediate consequence is the reduction of investments and capital. Following
equation (20), a decreased level of investments leads to a lower price of capital, reducing
capital gains for banks and, therefore, worsening credit conditions. Again, we see how
banks on areas with new investment opportunities face a decrease of their net worth,
while the opposite is true for banks on areas without new investment opportunities.
The total net worth of banks still increases, even if less than in the previous cases, due
to the reduced contribution of banks on areas of type ”n”.
As a result of the dynamics analyzed so far, the variable a increases above its steady
state value. Again the “zero profits area” increases and, therefore, the probability of
default increases. What is interesting now is that we have an additional channel with
which monetary politics affect the real economy. Through equation (33) the decisions
on the risk less interest rate affect the total supply of interbank credit and, therefore, the
total amount of loans to firms. An expansionary policy reduces the value of a allowing
for a larger supply of credit to the economy and, at the same time, reduces the default
probability on the interbank market, contributing to the stability of the system. This, of
course, comes at the price of an higher inflation rate and a lower level of banks’ capital.
The increase in the inflation rate is something standard in this type of literature; in this
context the real source of concerning is the lower level of banks’ capital induced by an
expansionary policy. Despite, in fact, it reduces the probability of default it leaves the
system more fragile to additional exogenous financial shocks. However, the evidences of
this model suggest that in times of financial turmoil, reducing the interest rate (when
possible) may benefit both the real and the financial sectors.
The last type of shock we have considered is a pure riskiness shock affecting equation
(33). Namely this shock can be thought as an increase, for any exogenous reason, of
the riskiness of banks that access the interbank market to acquire funds. For example
it may be seen as a deterioration of their reserves or of the value of their balance sheet
assets or any other type of shack that affects their solvency.
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A positive shock on the value of a shifts the level of the threshold to the right,
making banks more fragile to shocks on the returns of their investments. As a result,
the default probability increases, for given levels of the fundamentals of the banking
system. On the contrary, a negative shock on a shifts the level of the threshold to the
left, decreasing the “zero profits area” and, therefore, making banks more robust to
unexpected shocks on the returns. These particular dynamics are a consequence of the
fact that a is negative in the steady state and that the fragility of the banking system
is negatively correlated with it.
In our model we simulated a negative shock on a. As expected, the default proba-
bility decreases significantly; this is not a surprise if we remember how it is defined in
equation (43). What is surprising is that, despite it generates volatility in consumption,
through the changes in its marginal utility, a decrease in the average default probability
is connected to a decrease in output, a reduction in real wages and a limited increase
in inflation.
The main reason behind this is related to the drop in investments. In fact, as
a increases the returns and the total volume of interbank lending decrease following
equations (30) and (40). This fact reduces the total amount of credit extended to firms
and, with that, the volume of investments. As investments fall, Qi decreases, worsening
the condition of banks on investment areas and reducing even more the supply of
interbank loans. The combine effect of these processes reduce the total demand and, as
a consequence, output drops. The Central Bank should than intervene reducing the risk
less rate, making than relatively more convenient to invest on interbank loans, however
this do not occurs.
The explanation for that may be found on the goods market. As investment drops,
firms are forced to increase the labor share in the production process. Doing so, hours
worked increase while wages decrease. At the same time, however, firms produce with
an inefficient combination of inputs, therefore marginal costs increase and inflation
follows. According to the Taylor principle, equation (56), the Central Banks balances
output and inflation when choosing the policy rate, in this case the change in inflation
offsets the change in the output and, therefore, leads to an increase in the interest rate,
worsening the crisis.
The main point that can be drawn from this experiment is that the equilibrium is
delicate. An excess of stability may reduce the returns on interbank lending, leading to
a drop in vestment and output. However, too much riskiness produce a similar effect,
but of greater magnitude. Policy maker should consider both side of the problem in
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the difficult task of searching for the equilibrium between output growth and financial
stability.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we integrated into a standard DSGE model with frictions a complex
financial system. The economy is populated by banks that are affected by demand
shocks, shocks on the returns of investment and are financially constrained. They
interact on a complex interbank market to exchange funds between them but doing so
they become exposed to the risk of default. The key feature of the model is that banks
with excess of liquidity have an alternative option (constituted by the acquisition of
risk free assets) to the investment into the interbank market. When the conditions on
the interbank market become critical, banks with excess funds simply divert them to
assets that grant safe returns, shielding them self from the losses connected to potential
defaults. However, this comes at the price of lowering the total amount of funds that
the banking system is able to transfer to firms, thus decreasing investment and capital.
The analysis of the behavior of each bank allows to identify the causes of the risk
of default and a measure of global financial stability, defined as the average probability
of default, for each bank, in a given moment.
With this result it is possible to connect the business cycle and the stability of the
financial system trough a micro-founded model and to observe, along with the fluctua-
tions of output or inflation how the financial system changes its average characteristics
of risk.
The simulation of different types of shock shows how generally the default proba-
bility of each bank and the business cycle comoves. In particular, an increase in the
default probability increases the riskiness of interbank lendings and leads banks to di-
vert funds to risk less assets. This triggers a decrease in investment and a fall in output.
In addition, a standard Taylor principle might present an additional channel in which
it can affect the real economy.
In fact, if output and inflation drop, the Central Bank will try to stimulate the
economy lowering the interest rate, this had the (positive) side effect of reducing the
opportunity cost of investing on the interbank market and, therefore, causes an increase
of interbank loans and credit to firms. This simple principle appears to be on one hand,
robust to the expansion of the standard macroeconomic model to the inclusion of a
complex financial system and, on the other, seems to suggest the presence of additional
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channels of transmission of monetary policy not studied so far.
However, our simulations show also how the equilibrium in this type of framework is
hard to achieve. In fact, on the contrary, as the monetary policy tries to fight inflation
it also generate a worsening of the stability of each bank, increasing the average default
probability. In addition, we have shown how shocks on the fundamentals of banks leads
into a difficult situation where the economy shrinks but, at the same time, the central
bank alone is not able reduce the riskiness but, on the contrary, it might even worsen the
situation. This model, therefore, calls for alternative instruments of monetary policy,
to be used in extraordinary circumstances, that can achieve the results that, in some
cases, a simple monetary policy rule is not able to obtain. For example, in the case
under consideration, a temporary increase in of the robustness of banks balance sheets
(for example trough refinancement operations) seems more appropriate to increase the
value of the assets of banks, reduce their probability of default and increase the amount
of credit granted by the financial system.
In conclusion, this model shows the complex interactions that exist between the
financial market and the real economy. Financial agents, especially in times of crisis,
are particularly sensible to the riskiness of their counterparts. With this model we have
analyzed an economy where counterpart risk is take explicitly into consideration and
its connection to the real economy is clarified. In this context, the standard Taylor
principle seems unadeguate to counterbalance real shocks while it presents some limits
when it comes to pure financial shocks. In particular, in the case of riskiness shocks, the
application of the Taylor principle may even worsen the crisis and, therefore, in those
circumstances our model calls for the implementation of different and unconventional
policy instruments.
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Appendix A: Parameters Values
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Name Value
β Discount Factor 0.99
δ Depreciation Rate 0.025
C/Y Consumption to Output 0.62
I/Y Investment to Output 0.18
G/Y Government Spending to Output 0.20
pii Probability of new investments 0.25
pin Probability of absence of new investments 0.75
σ Bank’s surviving probability 0.972
h Dispersion of Returns 0.5
Y/K Output to capital ration 3
θ Degree of financial friction 0.129
θR Calvo parameter 0.75
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Table 2: Estimated Parameters
Parameter Prior Shape Prior Mean Post. st. Dev. Post. Mean 10% 90%
σεe Γ−1 0.01 2 15.6631 7.1084 24.1765
σεA Γ−1 0.01 2 5.9798 2.9871 8.8270
σεd Γ−1 0.01 2 22.3271 19.9628 24.6378
σεr Γ−1 0.01 2 1.1123 0.6661 1.5642
σεg Γ−1 0.01 2 2.6648 2.4200 2.9009
ρe β 0.5 0.2 0.9960 0.9929 0.9992
ρA β 0.5 0.2 0.9875 0.9806 0.9947
ρd β 0.5 0.2 0.9843 0.9722 0.9967
ρr β 0.5 0.2 0.9623 0.9384 0.9876
ρd β 0.5 0.2 0.9936 0.9888 0.9987
α β 0.33 0.05 0.3788 0.2996 0.4571
ϕ β 0.5 0.1 0.7420 0.6810 0.8043
ε β 0.1 0.01 0.1007 0.0842 0.1172
f β 0.25 0.1 0.0385 0.0230 0.0540
ψy Γ 0.8 0.2 0.2456 0.1346 0.3527
ψpi Γ 1.5 0.5 2.5746 1.5167 3.5706
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Appendix B: Figures
Figure 1: Prior and Posteriors, deep parameters.
Figure 2: Prior and Posteriors, autocorrelation coefficients.
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Figure 3: identification tests. Upper panel: results of the test based of equation (60); blue
bars represent normalization based on prior mean and red bars on standard deviation at the
prior mean. Lower panel: results of the test based on equation (61); blue bars represent
normalization based on prior mean and red bars on standard deviation at the prior mean.
None of the two tests shows signs of weak identification as the absolute values of the
indicators is always positive.
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Figure 4: moments derivatives. Bars represent the absolute values of (weighted) derivatives
of different Jacobin matrices. They prove how the data are informative for the estimation of
the parameters of the model.
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Figure 5: low singular values. 5 lowest singular values computed after equation (62) and
associated vectors.
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Figure 6: high singular values. 5 highest singular values computed after equation (62) and
associated vectors.
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